This week I was torn between writing about either Scottish independence or the demise of Glasgow Rangers F.C, in the wider sporting context, but none the less, I am opting for the former, and rest assured had I chosen the other, there would have been just as much Scottish sentiment. Alex Salmond and David Cameron both met this week with the former angling for independence, and the later trying to preserve the Union, with reportedly “little progress” being reported by Cameron and Salmond saying ‘things have moved substantially’. However, in keeping with the article title, I believe that Scottish independence is more of a vanity project on Salmond’s behalf than a feasible long term aim, and the best course of action is to keep the Union together( perhaps, argue instead for more devolved powers), for a number of soon to be highlighted reasons.

Clearly, the most obvious reasons are economic. I will split this into two broad areas, namely assets and survival and secondly, currency. On the first point, a few basic facts, the UK’s debt problem is well highlighted but the Scottish endure higher spending than in England per capita (England-8% to Scotland’s 12%) at a time when this very figure is being cut, clearly being unsustainable. Secondly the North Sea oil reserves are declining and with any quasi-non renewable resource such as oil, it will not replenish quickly, leading to fiscal imbalances, which would do no favours to the objective of cutting spending, aforementioned. At present, actuarial estimates proportionally put Scottish debt between £140bn and potentially £270bn, for a nation with only 5.22 million people at 2010 (latest available) figures, giving a fairly large debt per capita ratio. Overall, even if North Sea oil was included, then Scotland alone would still be running a £9bn deficit, making it in the long term clearly unsustainable. In addition to this, Salmond also had the cheek to ask for proportionally to population, 8.4% of British assets (gold, defence etc) but also to keep 95% of North Sea oil revenues. Primarily, how do you give 8.4% of assets to Scotland (send gold by train? With Network Rail it will still probably be delayed like usual) and if he wants proportionality, why is he not having 8.4% of North Sea oil? He can’t just have proportionality when it suits him.

My second point is equally as practical and as big an object as the first. The currency options available are join the Euro (at the moment about as attractive as starting up a pension fund with Bernard Madoff), sticking with sterling, or creating their own. I would argue, the middle option is by far the most sensible economically, but one would ask doing this would make independence relatively pointless an exercise, as there would be no way the Bank of England would give a Scottish central bank, control over monetary policy (interest rates, bonds etc), as the chance could arise for policy actions on the same currency to be different (e.g. one raises, one cuts rates), creating havoc and general confusion in the markets, and with the public, leaving them with no more fundamental monetary independence than at present. The option of creating a Scottish currency or joining the Euro is problematic for both similar reasons. There is no certainty they will get into the EU due to their debt levels and it is likely they would lose power and influence which they implicitly enjoy as members of the Union.

The creation of a new state and monetary system would not only be costly, but also see many firms perhaps leave Scotland which are based there to be in the Union, rather than being in Scotland alone, further worsening the precarious fiscal position. Edinburgh as Europe’s 5th biggest financial centre would perhaps suffer, and along with declining trade/exports (oil) could be forced to rely more and more on the derivatives market, and other short term funding mechanisms to finance their balance of payments, should they run up further spending bills, or see a drop in the oil prices (which under the pound, the BoE would take a dim view of). On a state level itself, unless using the pound there is no chance in a month of Sundays that the credit ratings agencies will give Scotland a AAA rating like the UK has at the moment, meaning the cost of Scotland’s borrowing will be higher and paid for by you and I (if we were Scottish). Salmond’s big idea is to become closer to the Scandinavian countries, and run an oil fund (like Norway), to save up their (as mentioned, dwindling) revenues, over 30 years. Although, the fundamental difference is that, when the other countries started their oil piggy banks, they had no debts, leaving Salmond’s critique of the UK for not having one maybe slightly lacking, given our current position.

Therefore, overall, the economic or political case does not stand up, and even under Westminster rule it is hard to say they are persecuted (under their own system or EU rule, they would still be subject to many of the same things as at present), given the Barnett formula now seems outdated and generous, by the creator’s own admission and the “West Lothian Question” of Scottish MP’s voting on English matters, but not vice versa, brings further constitutional issues to the fray. Many Labour and Lib Dem seats are in Scotland, so Salmond can expect no support from any of the three main parties south of the border. The pure vanity of the project is summed up in the proposed date, the day of the Battle of Hornshole, 500 years ago in 2014, to maximise nationalism and turnout. Therefore, the whole project seems to be Salmond’s way of etching his name in the history books as “The Man Who Freed Scotland” rather than chasing the policy based on any sound economic, political or influential grounds, which the real pragmatist would surely have based an aim upon.